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LAW REVIEW

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF A NATIONAL
POPULATION POLICY
PROFESSOR MEANSt

I

HAVE INTERPRETED my mission, as the only lawyer on
this panel, as one of exploring the constitutional aspects of a
national population policy. Before I get into that, I note that two of
the previous speakers have said that the United States government
is a newcomer in the science or art of population policy. This assertion
I rather think is belied by the fact that our national birth certificate the Declaration of Independence - is the first American public document to announce a population policy. In Jefferson's rough draft which,
in this passage, was not altered in the final redaction of that instrument,
the last and least beloved of our Kings was accused of the following
act of tyranny:
[H]e has endeavored to prevent the population of these states;
for that purpose obstructing the laws for naturalization of foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their migrations
hither; & raising the conditions of new appropriations of lands.'
In this quaint and, for us, ancient text we find lurking aspects
of population policy which are with us still; a numerical goal and the
use of economic motivation to attain it. Policy then was the opposite of
what it is now; then it was "more"; now it is "no more." At that time
a nation's problem was to get as many people as it could from wherever
it could get them. Any sovereign who obstructed the laws for naturalization of foreigners, etc., put his country at a disadvantage in competing in the international market for migratory population. The reason
why the states of the world were so busily competing for all the people
they could get is plain enough. It has been calculated that the rate
of natural increase of the population of Europe between the reign
of Augustus and A.D. 1650 was only one-tenth of one per cent per year.
That was at a time when the birth rate was much higher than it is
now. In those centuries, indeed, the birth rate approached the biological
maximum. The reason why the rate of increase was so small was
because the death rate was so high. This high death rate did not
substantially diminish until the latter half of the nineteenth century.
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Thus, when we commenced as a nation, our policy was - and so
remained for many, many years - to get as many people as we could
by whatever means were available. To this end we encouraged both
natural reproduction and immigration.
When the nineteenth century drew to a close, however, other
sentiments began to make a timid and tentative appearance in our
public documents, as we shall shortly see.
I shall consider the constitutional problems apposite to the kind
of population policy that is desired today - i.e., one of limiting
population, rather than increasing it - from the point of view of two
antitheses. One is the contrast between voluntary and involuntary
measures. The second is the situs, in our federal system, of governmental power to deal with this problem, viz., federal versus state
exercise of such power.
The voluntary measures, as the previous speakers have pointed
out, are three: Contraception, sterilization, and abortion. Possibly
others will be invented which will defy classification by this neat
trichotomy, but these three are all we have today. So far as existing
voluntary measures are concerned, we have a growing body of recent
judicial precedents to guide us.
Contraception, as we know from the case of Griswold v. Connecticut,2 decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1965, is a federal
constitutional right, at least of married couples.
That sterilization is at least a legal right of married couples
is the teaching of the case of Jessin v. County of Shasta,' decided in
1969 by a California district court of appeal. Since the defendant
county, which lost, took no further appeal, no ruling in that particular
case will be forthcoming from a higher court. There, Mr. and Mrs.
Jessin requested the county hospital to perform a vasectomy on the
husband and the hospital refused. In California, as in nearly all the
states, there is no law prohibiting voluntary sterilization. Nevertheless,
the hospital, using the same committee which also decides what abortions may be performed, refused to permit a vasectomy in this case.
The couple then sued the county, and the district court of appeal held
that voluntary sterilization was their legal right. Although the briefs
had urged upon the court the constitutional questions, it contented
itself with declaring existing California law. Since the ruling was
in favor of the Jessins, there was no need to consider the question
of whether their right was not merely legal, but also constitutional,
in character. I have no doubt, however, that if ever a court is
2. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

3. 274 Cal. App. 2d 810, 79 Cal. Rptr. 359 (3d Dist. 1969).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss4/5
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compelled to decide that question, the decision will be in favor of the
constitutional character of the right to voluntary sterilization.
In regard to abortion, there have been three recent cases. The
first, People v. Belousj was decided in 1969 by the Supreme Court
of California. The second, United States v. Vuitch, was decided by
a single judge in -the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, later in 1969. The third, Babbitz v. McCann,' was
decided in 1970 by a three-judge federal court in the Eastern District
of Wisconsin. In all three of these cases long existing antiabortion
statutes - two of them state statutes and one an act of Congress were held to be unconstitutional. The two federal decisions, United
States v. Vuitch and Babbitz v. McCann will probably be before the
United States Supreme Court for argument in the October Term
1970; the California decision will not. In addition, there are four
more federal cases pending before a three-judge court in the Southern
District of New York.' If the New York legislature does not make
them moot by enacting a law 9 similar to the legalization bill that has
just become law, without the Governor's signature, in Hawaii,"° they
will doubtless also 'be before the United States Supreme Court in the
4. 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969).
5. 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969).
6. 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
California v. Belous, 397 U.S. 915 (1970). In the
7. Certiorari denied sub noma.
Vuitch case, after the Solicitor General docketed the appeal of the United States, the
Court requested briefs on the question whether a decision holding unconstitutional
an act of Congress territorially limited to the District of Columbia was directly
appealable to the Supreme Court, bypassinig the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. The Solicitor General submitted a brief contending that it was. The Court
thereupon set the case on the calendar, but postponed to the argument on the merits
this jurisdictional question. 397 U.S. 1061 (1970). On the final day of term, the
Court propounded three additional questions, all strongly suggestive of further jurisdictional doubts. 399 U.S .....
, 26 L. Ed. 2d 789, 90 S.Ct. 2235 (1970). The upshot
may well be that the Supreme Court will not consider the Vuitch case until it has
first been heard by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
A similar fate - intermediate consideration by various Courts of Appeal for
several Circuits prior to hearing by the Supreme Court - may also await the Babbitz
case and other three-judge court decisions which have held unconstitutional State
abortion laws, but have not enjoined their enforcement, by reason of Rockefeller v.
Catholic Medical Center, 397 U.S. 820 (1970), and Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U.S. 427
(1970), both decided after the Symposium. Thus the statement in the text that such
cases "will doubtless ...be before the United States Supreme Court in the October
Term 1970" cannot now be confidently made; the October Term 1971 would now
(September 1970) seem safer odds.
8. Lyons v. Lefkowitz, 305 F. Supp. 1030 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (granting motion
for a three-judge court).
9. Subsequently to the Symposium, such a law was indeed enacted by the New
York legislature and approved by Governor Rockefeller. N.Y. Laws 1970, ch. 127
(approved April 11, 1970, effective July 1, 1970). On July 1, 1970, the three-judge
court held that this new law has made all of these four cases moot.
A third State, Alaska, has also legalized abortion in 1970. After the Governor
vetoed a legalization bill, his veto was overridden by the required majorities in both
houses, and became law. Alaska Laws 1970, ch. 103 (veto overridden April 30, 1970,
effective July 29, 1970).
10. Hawaii Laws 1970, Act I (became law March 11, 1970, without the governor's
with immediate
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October Term 1970. Thus, it is possible that in the very near future,
conceivably before this calendar year is out, there will be a decision
at the highest level in regard to voluntary abortion as a federal
constitutional right.
Thus we find ourselves virtually at the stage where there no
longer is -

or at least it seems there will no longer be -

any im-

pediment to the free use of voluntary measures throughout the country.
In the case of abortion this will make some difference of a
quantitative kind, in addition to the obvious improvement in quality
of service. Though the antiabortion laws are honored far more in the
breach than in observance, doubtless there are a substantial number
of pregnancies that are not terminated by abortion simply because
these laws exist. Passage of laws legalizing abortion, or achievement
of the same end by a decision that the old laws have become unconstitutional, would therefore increase the total number of abortions
as well as legalize them.
Now, if Professor Charles Westoff and Dr. Wishik, who I
believe took the same position, are right in saying that voluntary
measures would eliminate all or nearly all of the unwanted or following Professor Driver's distinction - unanticipated children that
otherwise would be born, it seems likely that the United States would
never experience a need to resort to involuntary measures. Indeed, I
feel a bit like a character out of Alice in Wonderland discussing involuntary measures at this stage of our history because American
public opinion (including my own) has been so little prepared for
serious thought of them. Perhaps India is better prepared since there
a cabinet minister can publicly discuss such a possibility. Nevertheless,
our exploration of the American constitutional position would be
incomplete if this question were left undiscussed.
So far as these three antinatality measures - contraception,
sterilization, and abortion - are concerned, only sterilization has ever
been imposed by law in the United States. Where involuntary sterilization has been imposed by law, the dominant motive has not been one of
population policy at least in the quantitative sense.
The two famous cases concerning involuntary sterilization, both
decided by the United States Supreme Court, are Buck v. Bell" in 1927
and Skinner v. Oklahoma1 2 in 1942. Buck v. Bell dealt with hereditary
epilepsy: "[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough"'" is the famous
exclamation wherein Justice Holmes put in a nutshell the reasoning
11. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
12. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
13. 274 U.S. at 207.
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of the Court sustaining the Virginia statute in that case. In Skinner,
however, where the Oklahoma legislature had imposed sterilization as
a punishment for one (but not for other similar) crime, the Court's
majority struck down the statute as a denial of equal protection, while
concurring Justices voiced even deeper doubts of the constitutionality
of sterilization as a punitive measure.
Only once have Justices of the United States Supreme Court
considered the question whether involuntary sterilization would be constitutional as a measure of population policy. This was dictum in a
concurring opinion written by then Justice Goldberg in which he was
joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan, in Griswold v.
Connecticut.4 In this dictum, Justice Goldberg was endeavoring to
refute a position taken by one of the dissenting Justices in that case.
When Justices fall to arguing among themselves, of course, like most
of us, they tend to overstate by way of emphasis. At any rate, this
is the Goldberg dictum:
Surely the government, absent a showing of a compelling, subordinating state interest, could not decree that all husbands and
wives must be sterilized after two children have been born to
them ....
[T]he personal liberty guaranteed by the Constitution
does . . . inclu. protection against such totalitarian limitation
of family size, which is at complete variance with our constitutional
concepts."5
I acknowledge the excellence of this rhetoric, but draw your attention
to the saving clause: "absent a showing of a compelling, subordinating
state interest." Clearly, the farthest thing from the minds of Justices
Goldberg, Warren and Brennan in 1965 was a serious thought that
ever in the United States there could be a reasonable showing of a
compelling subordinating state interest of this kind. Now, five years
later, would they still be so sure? Opinion about population policy
has evolved rather rapidly in the past five years. I wonder whether
today, if either of these three Justices were presented with the same
opportunity, he would avail himself of it in quite the same language,
or with quite the same enthusiasm. The Goldberg dictum is, of course,
formally true. Only a showing of a compelling, subordinating state
interest could constitutionalize involuntary sterilization; but if, in time,
we were to drift into an era wherein mounting pollution and overpopulation were about to overwhelm us, surely some governmental
authority in the United States ought to be held to have constitutional
14. 381 U.S. at 496-97 (1965).
15. Id.
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power to meet the problem in that way, assuming there were no other
less severe alternatives then available. By then there probably will be,
because science is making rapid progress in this realm. Scientific
friends have told me of experiments now in progress looking to the
perfection of a substance which can be administered by injection that
will make one sterile for considerable but limited periods, so that it
will no longer be necessary to submit to an incisive and often
irreversible operation such as vasectomy or salpingectomy. Should
this come to pass, then, if involuntary measures were found necessary
and constitutionally permissible, courts would doubtless insist that
government resort to the less severe alternative rather than vasectomy
or salpingectomy.
Passing from the voluntary versus involuntary antithesis to the
situs of power in our system to deal with the problem of overpopulation, on either a voluntary or an involuntary basis depending on the
needs of the times; I suppose that most of us shared (as initially I did)
Professor Driver's instinctive reaction that this problem is, if any
problem is, within the virtually exclusive competence of the states.
Therefore, it would seem that the federal government would have
a very difficult task making out a case for the constitutionality of its
exercise of power in this sphere.
When I began to ruminate amongst the authorities, I began to
realize that the clause above quoted from the Declaration of Independence is more than an isolated historical curiosity. It illuminates
certain later texts of which we are all aware, but to which perhaps
few of us have given thought in this connection. Thus its word
"migrations" is carried over - in the singular, to be sure - into that
clause of the original Constitution which we commonly remember
as the Slave Trade Clause:
The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the
States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be
prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight
hundred and eight...1"
The Supreme Court early noticed that the word "migration" was in
this clause, and held that it applied to free persons, just as the word
"importation" applied to slaves. This clause, being an exception to
the general power granted to Congress over interstate and foreign
commerce, was the basis for the conclusion that the migration of
free persons, no less than the importation of slaves, was a part of
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 9, c. 1.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss4/5
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foreign "commerce," and thus, after January 1, 1808, subject to
Congressional control. The authorities for these propositions are
Gibbons v. Ogden 7 in 1824 and The Head-Money Cases 8 in 1884.
In two later cases, both involving Orientals - Chae Chan Ping v.
United States, commonly referred to as The Chinese Exclusion Case,'"
in 1889, and Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 20 in 1892 - the Court
again returned to this theme. Now, however, it based the power of
Congress to exclude aliens, not expressly on the commerce clause,
which was scarcely mentioned, but upon the power inherent in every
sovereign member of the society of nations to decide who shall enter
the country. Indeed, in The Chinese Exclusion Case, the Court affirmed
the right of every country to protect itself from the "vast hordes of
. . . people crowding in upon us."'" This is the first note in our
jurisprudence of a desire to limit our total population. Curiously,
in both of these cases the commerce clause is not heavily relied upon
and passes virtually unmentioned; yet, it must have been in the back
of the Justices' minds. Nevertheless, the cases are significant as
showing a recognition by the Court that population limitation is a
legitimate object of the federal power to make international treaties
which were involved in those cases.
If we had no more to go on than what has been said up to this
point, however, it would be difficult if not impossible to make out a case
for federal power to legislate a national population policy. The commerce clause will not assist us for, prostitution apart, it would be absurd
to speak of the human fecundative act as "commerce," and even if it
were not, such acts are rarely interstate.
There is, however, a later line of cases dealing once again with
migration, but this time not of the migrations of men but of birds.
These bird-migrations were held, contrary to what one would expect,
not to be within the ambit of the commerce clause. This line of cases
gave rise to the precedent which may yet prove to be our salvation in
this field.
In 1896, in Geer v. Connecticut,22 the Supreme Court held that
each state in the Union was the successor of the Crown as the owner
of all migratory birds which happen to be flying over it. Just as
the British Crown had a right of property in those birds before
Independence, so now do, not the United States, but the several states.
17. 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 1, 216-17 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.).
18. Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
19. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
20. 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
21. 130 U.S. at 606.
22. 161 University
U.S. 519 Charles
(1896).Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1970
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Since this was so, the Court allowed Connecticut to prohibit anyone
(even a state-licensed hunter) killing migratory birds within its borders
from taking them to another state. Connecticut's power to prevent
the movement of a migratory bird killed in Connecticut, across her
borders, was based on the State's ownership of the bird. However,
had the Connecticut law regulated private property in the same manner, the commerce clause would have invalidated it.
Notwithstanding Geer v. Connecticut, in 1913 Congress passed
a migratory bird statute, 8 regulating the hunting of such birds and
creating open and closed seasons in regard to them. In two cases,
United States v. Shauver 4 and United States v. McCullagh,25 federal
district courts held the 1913 act to be unconstitutional on the basis
of the Geer decision. They ,held that the commerce clause could not
be invoked to justify the act of Congress because the birds were the
property, not of the United States, but of the several states.
Thereafter, in 1916, the United States and Canada negotiated a
migratory bird treaty,26 in which both powers agreed to regulate the
killing of migratory birds. In 1918 Congress passed a new migratory
bird statute,27 quite similar to the 1913 act, but now based, not upon
its commerce clause power, but upon its treaty clause power. The
great case of Missouri v. Holland28 arose under this 1918 act. As you
all know, Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, conceded that the
1913 act had been unconstitutional for the reasons stated by the lower
federal courts but held that the 1918 act must be upheld because the
1916 international treaty had been entered into which was a new and
adequate source of congressional power.
Here, therefore, we discern a way whereby Congress can enter
a field, such as population policy, which does not qualify as "commerce."
What is required is that there be a legitimate subject for the exercise
of the treaty-making power - something properly negotiable with
29
foreign states.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Act of March 4, 1913, c. 145, 37 STAT. 847.
214 Fed. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1914).
221 Fed. 288 (D. Kan. 1915).
39 STAT. 1702 (1916).

27. Act of July 3, 1918, c. 128, 40 STAT.755.
28. 252 U.S. 416 (1920), affirming 258 Fed. 479 (W.D. Mo. 1919).
29. Cf. Pierce v. State, 13 N.H. 536, 576 (1843) (dictum), for an early attempt
to list subjects not considered properly within the treaty-making power.
On reading this paper in galley, a learned non-lawyer friend (Christopher
Tietze, M.D.) asked me, "Why is it necessary to fall back on the treaty making
power . . . ? Wouldn't the General Welfare Clause do the trick?" His reference, of

course, was to the general welfare subclause in the taxation clause (CoNsT. art. I,
§ 8, cl.1). While that subclause grants no "power to provide for the general welfare
independently of the taxing power," United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 64 (1936),
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss4/5
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Until recently, I should have thought that this would still have
left us pretty much at the end of a blind alley, because as pointed out
by some of the previous speakers, whereas we have (or at any rate
profess) a keen interest in seeing that the underdeveloped countries
do not become overpopulated, what have we to give them, in return
for their undertaking to limit their population? In our own eyes,
we were not overpopulating our own country; so our promise to
limit our own population would hardly qualify as a serious quid .pro quo.
This objection, however, has now been met: studies have shown
that the population of the United States consumes the resources of
the world out of all proportion to its numbers. 0 So here, you see,
we have a bargaining counter: Something which we, as a developed
country, can offer to an underdeveloped country by way of treatynegotiation. We can undertake to limit our population for the purpose
of not overconsuming the natural resources of the world which developing countries need to become more developed. They will undertake to limit their population in order to prevent the consequences
of overpopulation -

disease and starvation -

which would cause

us great difficulties in meeting a moral obligation to keep them alive.
In this way, therefore, I believe that it would be possible,
without an amendment to the Constitution, to create a valid basis
for congressional legislation creating a national population policy.
The desirability of nationwide uniformity, which could scarcely be
achieved by the legislatures of fifty independent states, needs little
argument. The existing authorities permit the attainment of this
goal provided first a serious international treaty on the subject is
entered into.
What the content of a congressionally enacted, treaty-based national
population policy ought to be is a question of policy, as to which a
constitutional lawyer is no better qualified to advise than any layman,
and far less qualified than the experts who have spoken before me.
They are the true counsellors to the policy-makers in this sphere.
In concluding that the constitutional problems in this area, while
serious, are not insurmountable, I feel I have finished my task.
it would sustain such measures as Senator Packwood's proposal to abolish income

tax exemptions for all children beyond two born after a fixed future date. To the
extent that adjustment of the tax laws, and the grant of bounties for infertility under
the appropriation clause (CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7) - into which the Court in the
same case read the general welfare subclause (297 U.S. 1, 65 [1936]) - will "do the
trick," resort to the treaty power will, indeed, be unnecessary.
30. See Carter, The Population Crisis: Rising Concern at Home, 166 ScIENcE
722, 724-25 (Nov. 7, 1969).
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